What Finance Can Tell Us About the Trans Self-ID Debate

Guest Blog by Cyclefree, a lawyer/investigator specialising in financial services and whistleblowing investigations.

Financial scandals have the same features and failings occurring, repeatedly. What is concerning is to see these in a very different setting: the debate over trans self-ID, specifically, the Scottish government’s proposed GRA reforms.

Financial Lessons

At the heart of all scandals are conflicts of interest and self-delusion: believing what you want to be true and fitting facts to your belief.

The City’s 1987 Big Bang abolished restrictive barriers to facilitate competition. What this ignored was the resulting creation of ever larger financial institutions, creating multiple conflicts of interest between institutions, their clients, between clients and between different business areas. Internal Chinese walls tried to manage those conflicts. Self-regulation and — post the Guinness, Maxwell and Barings scandals — light-touch regulation were meant to do the rest. They did not work.

Why? Financiers deluded themselves into believing their own publicity — the myth of “star” traders, that they had discovered a new paradigm which meant that they were now able to manage risk so effectively that they could take more of it on, doing away with previous controls. They thought themselves so essential to the economy they could do pretty much what they liked. Politicians supported them in this delusion because it suited them. Finance lied to itself and others when problems arose: these were the proverbial “one or two” bad apples, not representative, it was unkind to tar everyone else with their brush etc. It did not correctly identify the risks it was running so did not deal with them properly or at all. We are all still paying the consequences (Note 1).

The law was clear enough. But the prevailing culture undermined it. Ethical blindness developed. When law and culture are at odds, it is usually the latter which prevails. Social contagion and conformity are more effective at determining behaviour than the strict letter of the law.

Several dangerous practices resulted:

  1. Rules were pushed to their limits, their spirit and intention ignored. “How do we do this?”, “Find me a way to do this”, “Where does it say I can’t do this? were the questions asked. Few understood the maxim: “Ask yourself not just whether you can do something. But whether you should.
  2. Nor was enough attention paid to the next question: “Why?” / “What are the disadvantages/risks?” The latter were either described as insignificant or manageable or, worst of all, said not to exist. Be very wary indeed when someone tells you that there are no disadvantages to a desired course, especially when this comes from those promoting it. The Mandy Rice-Davies dictum applies here.
  3. It became difficult to challenge even when issues arose. In virtually all scandals, there are people who know that something is not right, try to speak up and, if they do so, are ignored. There are other red flags as well, the common factor being that they are usually ignored, minimised or rationalised away. A culture of refusing to listen, of making people scared to challenge or ask “why” will make problems more likely to happen — and likely worse than they need be when they do erupt.
  4. Due diligence and verification were meant to be the way problematic issues could be identified. But too often this was not done properly, was seen as a tick-boxing exercise or its results ignored. So it became easy for bad actors to bypass these controls. “I am who I say I am” is the modus operandi of pretty much every financial fraudster there has ever been. Think of Bernie Madoff. Roger Levitt. Robert Maxwell. Ruja Ignatova, the crypto “Queen”. Markus Braun of Wirecard (Note 2). And not just financial — see Jimmy Savile. What they all also do is make it difficult to check their claims: via obscure accounting, layers of offshore companies, legal threats. Or just making it socially unacceptable to challenge or question.
  5. Conflicts of interest were either left unaddressed or not properly managed. More often it was assumed that the interests of the banks, its staff and its customers, as well as wider society, were one and the same and, indeed, could not be in conflict. The financial sector forgot that it was primarily there to serve others, not itself. The interests of those affected if matters went wrong were not sufficiently taken into account.
  6. More was seen as better. Most financial instruments which led banks into disaster started out as something worthwhile. Credit Default Swaps were originally devised as a means by which banks could minimise their risk i.e., by insuring against a company’s credit-worthiness. Then they came to be seen as products which could be traded very profitably. Rather than minimising risk, they ended up creating huge additional and poorly understood risks.
  7. Not just poorly understood but misdescribed — either because it suited those selling the products or because people had persuaded themselves that they were indeed risk free. But just because something is described as risk free does not make it so. What something is called does not change underlying material reality.

Much has changed in recent years. The focus is on properly identifying, understanding and managing risks, closing loopholes (if one exists it will be used), on trying to avoid the creation of conflicts of interests and, where these are inevitable, managing them properly.

There have been two important changes above all:

  • Creating a culture of speaking up about problems before they become crises to be managed.
  • Understanding that you cannot simply trust but must also verify. The level of verification needed is based on the assessment of the risk to and vulnerability of those affected by any failings. But the requirement is for more verification. Not less. And definitely not none at all.

There will always be bad actors. To think otherwise is naïve. And dangerous. Trying to root them out is playing Whack-A-Mole. But that steps must always be taken to prevent the former operating and risks becoming real are not in doubt.

GRA Reform

The debate is centred on trans people and their human rights, without ever stating what rights are missing. It assumes: (1) anyone should have the right to change gender; (2) only the needs of those wanting to do so are relevant. What is not asked is ask why anyone should. Nor whether everyone should. Nor what the impact on others may be.

The reform removes the requirement for a medical diagnosis (partly because of long delays getting one). Anyone over the age of 16 born or living in Scotland can change gender by making a self-declaration — with no verification of any kind. This is presented as a simple upgrade rather than a fundamental recasting making it something very different. (It is the equivalent of turning an obscure product designed for a limited purpose into a highly risky instrument traded by those whose motives may be self-serving or malicious.)

It repeats finance’s most serious mistakes:

  • Creating a loophole and an unmanageable conflict of interest by short-circuiting the process.
  • Abandoning any verification. The assumption is that no-one will ever lie or act maliciously or misuse the process for an unintended purpose.
  • Believing that a favoured group can be automatically trusted and allowed to behave freely without any controls.

Both of these are dangerously misguided, unsafe assumptions which do not survive a moment’s contact with reality.

  • Stating what you would like to be true (“Transwomen are women”) and assuming that changing a description changes reality. A man calling himself a woman but with a male body is self-evidently not the same as a woman with a female body. Legal nomenclature says nothing useful about risk.
  • Convincing yourself that there are no or few risks and so not identifying them accurately and ignoring or minimising any evidence or concerns suggesting otherwise.
  • Not assessing the impact on those likely to be harmed if matters go wrong.

The consequences are similar:

  • Substituting one value at the expense of others, equally important. The City’s “golden goose” revenues were extremely attractive. The costs of its behaviour, costs now being paid, were ignored. Now “inclusivity” is all important, with little regard for who might be included and who might thereby be or feel excluded. Safeguarding — which necessitates excluding some by discriminating on the basis of risk — is undermined.
  • Challenge and scrutiny are not only not encouraged but viewed with distaste and alarm. See Ms Sturgeon’s statement that objections are “not valid” — even before any consultation process has started. Seeking to rely on existing legal single sex exemptions is seen as offensive, phobic or bigoted. How they are to be preserved if self-ID happens is not explained.
  • The possible impact on others is not considered. Gender reassignment does not require surgical intervention. Since it will be available to any man or boy older than 16 virtually on demand, it means that there will be men legally treated as women retaining all the physical attributes of men. Since no verification that such men have dysphoria will be needed, any risk assessment should assume that the process could be used by those without dysphoria or with malicious aims.
  • This has not been done. The impact on women and girls as a class in the round is simply not considered. The risks are hand waved away; any evidence of risks (Note 3) or current research into what the risks might be are ignored or misinterpreted (Note 4).
  • Instead, the Scottish government announces that such risks cannot exist. See Shona Robison, MSP and Equalities Minister responsible for the proposed Bill in Holyrood on 3 March 2022:

There is no evidence that predatory and abusive men have ever had to pretend to be anything else to carry out abusive and predatory behaviour.

This is an extraordinarily ignorant statement. If there is one thing we know about sexual predators, it is that they will use whatever loopholes and opportunities exist, including pretending to be what they are not. Ample evidence confirms this (Note 5).

This statement is a classic example of saying what you want to be true, what you have to believe to justify what you want to do. It assumes both that trans people, as a group cannot, by definition, contain bad actors and that bad actors will never abuse a loophole or pretend to be something they aren’t. It is not a statement of fact. But of belief. It is self-delusion on a colossal scale.

This self-delusion — both about the nature of the reform and the absence of risks arising from it — bakes dishonesty from the start into the proposal and consultation process. That lack of honesty — about what you are doing, about the harm that has been caused and the potential risks, about the need to balance the rights of different groups, about the need to protect the most vulnerable if matters go wrong — means that, eventually, just as in finance, problems will arise.

But their cost will not be counted in money but in real harm to women.

Notes

Note 1: For a fuller description of City behaviour see http://www2.politicalbetting.com/index.php/archives/2017/01/20/cyclefree-asks-are-banks-the-new-unions/

Note 2: The FT’s account of the Wirecard scandal is riveting: an example of a fraud, whistleblowers and the extraordinary legal and other lengths the fraudsters went to to stop the FT’s investigation, aided by the German regulators who did not want to believe that their “superstar” digital bank was less than it seemed.

Note 3: The Cass Independent Review of Gender Identity Services for Children and Young People is at Cass Review — Independent Review of Gender Identity Services for Children and Young People (independent-review.uk). Its interim report was published on 10 March 2022.

Or see https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/sex-offenders-free-to-abuse-children-after-changing-id-bpdlx59p0.

See also paragraphs 13 and 14 of the High Court judgment on the lawfulness of the policy allowing transgender women convicted of sexual or violent offences against women to be housed in a women’s prison — https://www.bailii.crg-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2021/1746.html&query=(4198/2019. This sets out the information as at 2019 as provided by the Ministry of Justice.

Note 4: See the submission to Parliament’s Women’s Equality Committee about Swedish research into offending patterns in transgender women prisoners who have surgically transitioned — https://committtees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/18973/pdf/

Note 5: See IICSA reports — Reports & recommendations | IICSA Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse

The new interim version of the Equal Treatment Bench Book:

A significant step forward in its guidance on ‘Trans People’, but a long way still to go

A Guest Blog By Maureen OHara. She is a legal academic and former solicitor, who is doing research into the impact on women’s rights of the adoption of gender identity theory by criminal justice agencies

In December 2021 a new interim version of the Judicial College’s Equal Treatment Bench Book (ETBB) was published. Its guidance on ‘Trans People’ in chapter 12 includes significant amendments which take account of some of the criticisms of earlier versions made by gender critical feminists and lawyers.

These criticisms relate to broadly four areas, which are compulsion in relation to the use of the preferred pronouns and modes of address of trans-identifying parties to court proceedings; the adoption of tenets of gender identity theory as if they were fact; the implementation of self- definition of ‘gender identity’ in court proceedings; and the lack of transparency about who contributes to the ETBB’s content. Some of these criticisms have been partially addressed in the new version of the ETBB, while others have not.

In August 2021 a group of practising lawyers and legal academics wrote to the Lord Chief Justice expressing concerns about the previous ETBB guidance. The Lord Chief Justice passed our letter to the ETBB’s Editorial Panel for consideration. The text of the letter set out below. Some signatories’ names have been removed because they did not want them made public.

The revised version of the ETBB has taken on board some of the concerns the letter raised, particularly in relation to the treatment of witnesses giving evidence about their experiences of sexual and domestic violence.

In relation to the use of preferred pronouns, the previous version of the ETBB, published in February 2021, stated:

‘‘It is important to respect a person’s gender identity by using appropriate terms of address, names and pronouns. Everyone is entitled to respect for their gender identity, private life and personal dignity.’’ (p. 325)

Neither the February 2021 version of the ETBB nor previous versions which included this requirement, provided any guidance about how it should be implemented in practice in relation to witnesses other than those who identify as transgender, or about how judges should treat witnesses who perceive defendants in terms of their sex rather than their ‘gender identity’.

Some judges interpreted the guidance as requiring them to compel witnesses to use the preferred pronouns of defendants and other parties to proceedings who identify as transgender. This had particularly serious implications for witnesses who were giving evidence about traumatic events, such as being subjected to physical and sexual violence. Previous versions of ETBB did not address the impact on these witnesses of being required to describe a defendant in criminal proceedings, or an alleged perpetrator of domestic abuse in family proceedings, in ways which amount to a denial of their own perceptions of reality. The potential impact of the earlier guidance on complainants in criminal trials is discussed in this journal article which I wrote in 2019.

This account of being instructed by a judge to use a defendant’s preferred pronouns was given by Maria MacLachlan, who was assaulted in 2017. One of her attackers, Tara Wolf, who self-defined as a ‘trans woman’, was convicted of assault by beating in April 2018.

The revised ETBB recognises for the first time that witnesses have a right to refer to trans-identifying people using pronouns which align with their biological sex, and acknowledges that there may be circumstances where this is required by the interests of justice.

Paragraph 26 of chapter 12 states,

“There may be situations where the rights of a witness to refer to a trans person by pronouns matching their gender assigned at birth, or to otherwise reveal a person’s trans status, clash with the trans person’s right to privacy. It is important to identify such potential difficulties in advance, preferably at a case management [1] stage, but otherwise at the outset of the hearing. A decision would then have to be made regarding how to proceed, bearing in mind factors such as:

…Why the witness is unwilling or unable to give evidence in a way which maintains the trans person’s privacy. For example, a victim of domestic abuse or sexual violence at the hands of a trans person may understandably describe the alleged perpetrator and use pronouns consistent with their gender assigned at birth because that is in accordance with the victim’s experience and perception of the events. Artificial steps such as requiring a victim to modify his/her language to disguise this risks interfering with his/her ability to give evidence of a traumatic event.”

There will be occasions when, after these and other relevant factors have been considered, the interests of justice require that a witness or party may refer to the trans person using their former pronouns or name.”

The guidance then cites the provisions relating to special measures for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses contained in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and Domestic Abuse Act 2021. Previous versions of chapter 12 of the ETBB have not mentioned provisions relating to these groups of witnesses.

This amendment should mean that complainants giving evidence in trials for rape or other sexual offences will not be required to call male defendants ‘she’, and that women giving evidence in family proceedings about their experiences of domestic abuse will not be required to refer to their former male partners as though they were women.

The use of the language of rights in the amendment is significant. While this is an important step forward, many of the problems raised by the ETBB’s general guidance about the use of preferred pronouns are still not addressed in the new version. In practice witnesses’ ability to exercise their right to use pronouns which align with the sex of trans-identified parties to proceedings will be limited by the fact that the ETBB is likely to be interpreted to mean that the judge, the lawyers representing all parties in the proceedings, and perhaps other witnesses, should use preferred pronouns based on self-defined ’gender identity’. The ETBB does not discuss the implications for a witness of calling a trans-identified male ‘he’ while everyone else who speaks in the court room calls that person ‘she’. Where this happens it is likely to confuse and unnerve the witness, who may feel pressurised to use preferred pronouns themselves. This experience is likely to be particularly confusing and distressing for child witnesses and witnesses with learning disabilities.

In criminal proceedings this problem is likely to be compounded in cases where witnesses have already experienced the local police service and the Crown Prosecution Service referring to trans- identified defendants according to their ‘gender identity’ rather than their sex. Research carried out in 2019 by Fair Play for Women found that sixteen police services in England and Wales recorded the sex of suspects and offenders based on self-defined gender. Eight services confirmed in answer to a specific question relating to the offence of rape that they would record the sex of a rape suspect who identifies as transgender as female. In October 2021 it was reported that the Home Secretary intended to end these practices. Whether this will happen remains to be seen. The Crown Prosecution Service also operates a policy of recording the self-defined ‘gender’ of defendants.

In most respects the ETBB guidance makes no distinctions between people who identify as transgender who have obtained a Gender Recognition Certificate which changes their ‘gender’ in law, and those who have not. It has effectively introduced self-definition of ‘gender identity’ into the conduct of court proceedings, despite the fact that self-definition is not aligned with current law. This has not changed in the new guidance.

Another criticism of the previous ETBB was that it was partisan and adopted many of the tenets of gender identity theory as if they were matters of fact rather than opinion. This is discussed in depth in a Policy Exchange publication written in 2021 by Thomas Chacko, who also discusses the approach to self-identification in some detail.

The revised version of the ETBB continues to use language founded in gender identity theory which is widely contested, such as ‘gender assigned at birth’. Arguably, its overall approach remains imbued with gender identity theory, on which the implementation of self-definition of ‘gender identity’ is based.

The revised edition has clearly been influenced by the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) judgment in Forstater https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60c1cce1d3bf7f4bd9814e39/Maya_Forstater_v_CGD_Europe_and_others_UKEAT0105_20_JOJ.pdf v CGD Europe and Ors(2021) in which it was held that gender critical beliefs are protected beliefs under the Equality Act 2010. It is somewhat more even-handed than previous editions, in that it gives a brief explanation of gender-critical beliefs, notes that they are protected, and acknowledges for the first time that there is a debate in this area. However, the ETBB’s framing of the Forstaterjudgment arguably expresses implicit bias.

While it notes that gender critical beliefs are protected, the revised edition does not explicitly state that this is the result of the decision in Forstater, except in its Appendix on the Equality Act. Its only clear reference to the judgment in Forstaterin chapter 12 relates to what the EAT said about ‘misgendering’.

At paragraph 78, the new ETBB states,

“‘Gender-critical’ is a phrase which, broadly speaking, refers to a belief that sex is immutable and binary, and that people cannot transition. Very often it is linked to concerns that allowing the definition of women to include trans women would make the concept of ‘women’ meaningless and undermine protection for vulnerable women and girls. There is also often concern about what is seen as potential encroachment into ‘safe spaces’. Feelings can run very strongly on both sides of this debate. Clearly the ETBB takes no sides on this matter. The ETBB’s concern is simply that judges have some understanding of the perspectives of the variety of litigants and witnesses who appear before them. Gender-critical beliefs (as long as they do not propose for example to destroy the rights of trans people) are protected beliefs even if they might offend or upset trans people (and others). However, holding a belief is different from behaviour. As explained in the well-publicised Forstater case, ‘misgendering’ a trans person on a particular occasion, gratuitously or otherwise, can amount to unlawful harassment in arenas covered by the Equality Act 2010.”

The ETBB omits to note that the EAT reiterated that the position at common law as established in Corbett v Corbett (orse Ashley)[1971] P 83 is that sex is immutable (para.115), and that the Tribunal also stated that,

“…it is relevant to note, and it was not in dispute before us, that the Claimant’s belief is shared by many others.” (para.52)

Forstater is a landmark case in relation to the protection of gender critical beliefs which has significant implications for the treatment of witnesses who are gender critical or who do not share what the EAT in Forstatercalled “gender identity belief” (para.108). Given the significances of this case, a more neutral summary of the EAT’s judgment, and an exploration of its implications in relation to judicial attempts to require witnesses to use the preferred pronouns and modes of address of trans-identified parties in court proceedings, might have been expected.

The ETBB’s introduction of de factoself-definition of ‘gender identity’ happened without public consultation, and the process by which the ETBB guidance is developed is not open to public scrutiny. Melanie Newman reported in the Law Society Gazette in 2020 that the Judicial College had refused to identify the external organisations involved in training and policy formulation in relation to the ETBB. The Judicial College takes the view that it holds information about judicial training on behalf of the judiciary, and therefore this information is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Such lack of transparency creates an environment which is vulnerable to policy capture.

The fact that the Panel has considered our letter to the Lord Chief Justice and taken some of its concerns into account is an encouraging sign of increasing openness to a wider range of opinion. Perhaps there is hope that before the next edition of the guidance the Judicial College will develop a more transparent process for producing it.

Letter to the Lord Chief Justice

The Right Honourable

The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London

WC2A 2LL

27th August 2021

Dear Lord Chief Justice,

The Judicial College’s Equal Treatment Bench Book

We are a group of practising lawyers and legal academics. We are writing in a personal capacity to express our concerns about the implications for witnesses in both criminal and civil proceedings of the guidance on ‘Trans People’ in chapter 12 of the Judicial College’s Equal Treatment Bench Book.

Judges are interpreting this guidance as requiring them to compel witnesses to use the preferred pronouns of defendants who identify as transgender. We are particularly concerned about the implications of this guidance for adult and child complainants at criminal trials relating to violent and sexual offence, and for parties in family proceedings who are giving evidence about their experiences of domestic abuse.

The Bench Book states,

‘‘It is important to respect a person’s gender identity by using appropriate terms of address, names and pronouns.’’ (page 325)

No guidance is given about how this requirement should be carried out in practice in relation to witnesses other than those who identify as transgender, or about how judges should treat witnesses who perceive defendants in terms of their sex rather than their ‘‘gender identity’’. The guidance is written as if the use of a defendant’s preferred pronouns is simply a neutral administrative matter which will have no detrimental effects on witnesses, or on court proceedings.

This has particularly serious implications for witnesses who are giving evidence about traumatic events, such as being subjected to physical and sexual violence. The Bench Book guidance does not address the impact on these witnesses of being required to describe a defendant in criminal proceedings, or an alleged perpetrator of domestic abuse in family proceedings, in ways which amount to a denial of their own perceptions of reality. This is despite the fact that special measures which recognise the particular difficulties which these witnesses may face in giving evidence at court are provided in section 16 and 17 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 in relation to criminal proceedings, and in sections 63 and 64 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 in relation to victims of domestic abuse giving evidence in family and other civil proceedings.

The account below was given by Maria MacLachlan, who was assaulted in 2017. One of her attackers, Tara Wolf, who self-defines as a ‘trans woman’, was convicted of assault by beating in April 2018. MacLachlan has stated:

‘‘My experience of court was much worse than the assault…I was asked ‘‘as a matter of courtesy’’ to refer to my assailant as either ‘‘she’’ or the ‘‘defendant’’. I have never been able to think of any of my assailants as women because, at the time of the assault, they all looked and behaved very much like men and I had no idea any of them identified as women… I tried to refer to him as the ‘‘the defendant’’ but using a noun instead of a pronoun is an unnatural way to speak. It was while I was having to relive the assault and answer questions about it while watching it on video that I skipped back to using ‘‘he’’ and earned a rebuke from the judge. I responded that I thought of the defendant ‘‘who is male, as a male’’. The judge never explained why I was expected to be courteous to the person who had assaulted me or why I wasn’t allowed to narrate what had happened from my own perspective, given that I was under oath.’’ (Julie Moss, ‘Interview: Maria MacLachlan on the GRA and the aftermath of her assault at Speakers’ Corner’, Feminist Current, 21 June 2018, https://www.feministcurrent.com/2018/06/21/interview-maria-maclauchlan-gra-aftermath-assault- speakers-corner/)

The authors of the Bench Bookappear not to have considered the inter-action between its guidance and guidance in Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings(ABE). ABE states that judges have a responsibility to ensure that all witnesses are enabled to give their best evidence, and that that they must strike a balance under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights between protecting the defendant’s right to a fair trial and ensuring that witnesses are enabled to give evidence to the best of their ability. It requires judges to “…have regard to the reasonable interests of witnesses, particularly those who are in court to give distressing evidence, as they are entitled to be protected from avoidable distress in doing so.’’ (p.134)

The logic of the Bench Bookguidance is that a complainant in a rape trial can be required to call a defendant who has raped her (or him) ‘‘she’’, and to use female possessive pronouns to refer to the defendant’s body parts. This could also apply to child witnesses and vulnerable adult witnesses. The guidance does not consider how a child or an adult with learning disabilities might experience an instruction from an authority figure like a judge to refer to a biological male as ‘‘she’’. The right to accurately describe the sex of those who have assaulted them is crucially important to the ability of victims of violent and sexual offences to report violence and give evidence at court. Compelling witnesses to describe a defendant in ways which amount to a denial of their own perceptions of reality therefore undermines access to justice.

The use of pronouns and forms of address which reflect a person’s ‘gender identity’ rather than their sex is not simply a matter of social courtesy. For many people it is an expression of a political belief with which they profoundly disagree, and which they consider to be harmful to the rights of women, and to society as a whole. The Bench Bookguidance is effectively promoting the imposition of a form of compelled speech, which is an infringement of witnesses’ rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of expression, under articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights respectively. Both these articles protect the right not to be obliged to manifest beliefs that one does not hold, as stated in the case of Lee v Ashers Baking Co[2018] UKSC 49. The right not to be compelled to express a political belief is well established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

The courts have an obligation to balance the rights of defendants and witnesses in criminal trials, and to balance the rights of parties to civil proceedings. However, the Bench Book guidance prioritises the wishes and feelings of those who identify as transgender and includes no guidance for judges about balancing rights. The use of this guidance potentially impedes witnesses’ ability to give accurate and coherent evidence, particularly where giving evidence requires them to recall traumatic events. This cannot reasonably be said to be a proportionate means of achieving the Bench Book’sstated aims, and therefore its interference with witnesses’ Convention rights is not justified.

The Bench Bookguidance appears to be founded on what the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Forstater v CGD Europe and others(UKEAT/0105/20/JOJ) described as ‘gender identity belief’ (paragraph 108). This is the belief that ‘’everyone has a gender identity which may be different to their sex at birth and which effectively trumps sex so that trans men are men and transwomen are women’’ (paragraph 107). The Tribunal found that the Claimant’s lack of ‘gender identity belief’ was protected under Article 9 (1) ECHR and therefore within section 10 Equality Act 2010; as was her ‘gender-critical belief’, the core of which is that sex is biologically immutable (paragraphs 14 and 15). The Tribunal noted that this belief is in accordance with the current law (paragraph 115), and is shared by many people (paragraph 52).

The Bench Bookguidance is not aligned with the Gender Recognition Act’s provisions relating to the recognition of ‘gender identity’. It states that,

“It should be possible to recognise a person’s gender identity…for nearly all court and tribunal purposes regardless of whether they have obtained legal recognition of their gender by way of a Gender Recognition Certificate.’’ (page 326)

This effectively introduces self-definition of ‘gender identity’ into the conduct of court proceedings. However, such self-definition has not been incorporated into law in this jurisdiction. Proposals to amend the Gender Recognition Act to incorporate self-definition have been the subject of a public consultation, following which the government decided not to introduce these proposals into law. In advising judges to incorporate self-definition of ‘gender identity’ into the conduct of court proceedings, the Bench Book effectively advises judges to go beyond the law.

The Bench Book’s approach has been introduced without public consultation, and in the absence of any established public consensus. The Law Society Gazette has reported that, when asked to identify the organisations who assisted in the development of this guidance, the Judicial College stated that it was “not in the public interest to make public the names of those involved in this work.’’ (Melanie Newman, ‘Warning over transgender guidance to judges’, The Law Society Gazette, 24 February 2020, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/warning-over-transgender-guidance-to- judges/5103196.article).

We find this lack of transparency about the influences on such an important document very concerning, particularly as the document is not aligned with current law.

There appears to be increasing concern about the Bench Book’s guidance in this area outside of the legal profession, such that the think tank Policy Exchange has recently published a document written by barrister Thomas Chacko which suggests the guidance is in need of urgent revision. We attach a copy of this publication.

We ask that a review of this guidance be conducted with a view to amending it to ensure that it reflects the law, and that it takes account of the obligation to achieve an appropriate balance between the rights of all witnesses in court proceedings.

Yours sincerely,

Rosemary Auchmuty, Professor of Law

Sue Bruce, Solicitor

Thomas Chacko, Barrister

Naomi Cunningham, Barrister

Peter Daly, Solicitor

Eileen Fingleton, Solicitor

Francis Hoar, Barrister

Belinda Lester, Solicitor

Audrey Ludwig, Solicitor

Helen Nettleship, Barrister

Maureen O’Hara, Senior Lecturer in Law

Peter Ramsay, Professor of Criminal Law

Angela Smith, Solicitor

Robert Wintemute, Professor of Human Rights Law


[1]  A case management conference (civil law) or hearing (criminal law) is essentially a meeting which takes place before the main court proceedings between the allocated judge and lawyers for the parties, where decisions are made about various aspects of the conduct of the case. 

Two Key Questions

This article is written about women, but it could also apply to men and male only services.

As many readers will already know, the Equality Act 2010 provides for single sex services, and acknowledges that there will be times when it is reasonable for a service to exclude members of the opposite sex (para 27 Schedule 3) or to exclude on the basis of gender reassignment (para 28 Schedule 3). Evidently, it is not likely to be reasonable when someone is running a greengrocers, but it might well be when they are running a refuge or rape crisis centre and need to retain a recovery space that is female only, for example.

Today, the word “terfs” is trending on Twitter. This seems to have been prompted by a combination of factors, one of which is Margaret Atwood’s retweet of an article deemed unacceptable by the self-appointed terf-finder generals. At the time of writing, Atwood has not yet recanted, but did tweet “Read her piece, she’s not a terf” for which she was met with a barrage of comments insisting that the article did indeed bear the devil’s mark of terfery. 

The “not a terf” comment made me wonder: what IS a terf? Is the existing law a terf? And I think it reduces to these two key questions:

  1. Do you think that women and girls should ever have the right to meet or to access services where there is nobody present who was born male?
  2. If the answer to (1) is no, do you think that there is any stage in a male-born person’s proposed or actual transition where access to women’s spaces should be restricted?

Answering yes to one or both of these questions is in line with the existing law in the UK, which provides that single sex spaces are legal and that exclusion is justified where ‘a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ – and what is proportionate for someone who has decided in their own mind but not yet taken any physical steps at all towards transition, may not be the same as what is proportionate for someone who has socially and medically transitioned years ago.

Yet watching the terfs hashtag on Twitter, it seems that for the purists, the only available answer to either question is no. If you answer yes to either of them, then welcome to the coven – you may be horrified to learn it, but you too are among the terven. The only distance between us is which services should be restricted and how far along in transition a person should be to access them. 

For those who do, honestly, take the position that the answer to both questions must be no: you are advocating the abolition of single sex or separate sex services altogether, and therefore the abolition of some of the protections available on the basis of sex contained in the Equality Act. Anyone who wishes to advance such an extreme position must be able to formulate a cohesive argument in favour of this drastic legal change. “Shut the fuck up, terf” is not one.

Who Watches the Watchmen?

As a society we expect high standards of those in a position of responsibility. Flick through job adverts for positions in the police, prison service, and so on, and there will be phrases like “applicants must be able to show integrity” and “high personal and professional standards.”  An enhanced DBS check will be carried out, and training offered on expectations.

This rigorous procedure is a necessary element of safeguarding where one person is invested with real power over others. The power to deprive someone else of their liberty is one which should only be afforded to the most trustworthy, for obvious reasons. Responsibility for children is another.

And yet even with an enhanced DBS check, even with the checks and interviews and training and supervision, abusers and predators can slip through the net.

The use of his police powers by Wayne Couzens to kidnap and murder Sarah Everard is graphic and horrifying. But he is not the only police officer involved in abuse of women: at least 15 former or serving police officers have killed women since 2009. Just over this summer, Kevin Bentley (who boasted to victims that his position as a police officer made him “teflon”) was sentenced for 24 sexual assaults and Earling Leask was sentenced for grooming vulnerable women.

Nor are the police the only institution affected. Take for example the case of David Whitfield, a prison officer recently sentenced for demanding sexual favours from female prisoners in exchange for privileges – and in the same month, August 2021, Joshua Whitehead was sentenced for sexual assault while Jordan Jackman was jailed after he used his system access to obtain the personal details of a visitor he thought attractive. These incidents are not vanishingly rare. Clerics, teachers, caretakers and more – no matter how rigorous the checks, a predator who has not (yet) been arrested or convicted can work in these positions of power.

An unrealistic solution perhaps, in light of how many more women would need to be recruited – but if there are no safeguarding checks capable of dealing with an epidemic of violence against women, is it time to amend legislation so that only female police officers have permission to arrest and detain women, and only female prison officers may work in a women’s prison? 

Template Letter to AG re: Sam Pybus sentence

Many people have been saddened and horrified by the sentence handed down to Sam Pybus for the murder of Sophie Moss. He had pleaded guilty to manslaughter, but not to murder, using the so-called ‘rough sex defence’ that his violence towards her, in this case strangulation, had at the outset been consensual. His plea to manslaughter was accepted and he was jailed for 4 years and 8 months.

A number of people have asked how a sentence can be reviewed as ‘unduly lenient.’ It is done through the Attorney General’s office. A template letter is provided here.

Attorney General’s Office 

By email: uls.referrals@attorneygeneral.gov.uk

Date: [before 4 October 2021]

Dear Attorney General

I am writing to you to request a review of the sentence of Sam Pybus, passed at Teesside Crown Court on 7 September 2021, as unduly lenient. 

The sentence was one of four years and eight months imposed for manslaughter. Pybus had strangled Sophie Moss to death, while he was intoxicated. Although he said he could not remember what had happened, he entered a guilty plea saying it had occurred during consensual sexual activity. 

The Sentencing Guidelines state that where death “was caused in the course of an unlawful act which carried a high risk of death or GBH which was or ought to have been obvious to the offender” the appropriate category for sentencing is Category B, high culpability, which carries a starting point of 12 years custody. It ought to be obvious to anybody that strangulation carries a high risk of death or GBH. 

I would ask you to refer the sentence to the Court of Appeal as unduly lenient.

Yours sincerely

Yet More On Misgendering

This is yet another look at misgendering, in which I take a rather less robust view than Naomi – referencing her post here – as to when it might be reasonable to misgender a colleague in the workplace. (I am not looking at it outside that context, because the Equality Act does not govern how people relate to one another in the course of interpersonal relationships.)

I will use the same characters from Naomi’s blog: Jen and Liz. But in my version, Jen is not transitioning – rather, having attended an Alpha course, she has become a practising Christian, while Liz is an avowed atheist. In each case, the situation arises after a casual discussion about their respective plans for the weekend. Jen has told her colleagues that she will be baptised. It leads on to a more general discussion about religion in which, having been asked directly what she thinks, Liz makes clear that she views any religious belief as “delusional,” and refers dismissively to “sky fairies,” “science-deniers” and “medieval superstition.” (In a social conversation in which she was expressly asked, she is entitled to answer.)

Scenario 1 

In this scenario, Liz does not repeat her views on religion to Jen, and Jen does not say anything more about her faith to Liz. They continue working together, albeit with some awkward silences. 

This is clearly acceptable.

Scenario 2 

In this scenario, Liz makes a point of repeating her views on religion to Jen whenever they are together. Liz asks Jen whether she also believes in the tooth fairy, and demands to know why she is wearing a polycotton blouse when there is an edict in Leviticus 19 against wearing clothes made from more than one fabric. In the canteen, she highlights news stories about child abuse in the church or religious wars whenever Jen is nearby. When Jen asks her to tone it down, she points out in a way Jen finds belligerent that her lack of belief is just as much a protected characteristic as Jen’s belief, and suggests sarcastically that Jen practise turning the other cheek.

Liz is clearly harassing Jen.

Scenario 3 

Knowing that Liz is an atheist, Jen persistently tries to convert Liz despite Liz’s clear lack of interest, offering to pray with her, and giving her Bible study leaflets. After Liz’s picture is in the papers showing her attending a pro-choice march, Jen tries to interest her in materials including a “post abortion course” run by her church and focusing on forgiveness, which Liz finds particularly offensive because, unknown to Jen, Liz had an abortion aged 15 after being date-raped.

Jen is clearly harassing Liz, even if she was unaware of Liz’s personal history.

Scenario 4 

In this scenario, Liz does not target Jen in that she does not seek her out to denigrate her views and she does not repeat her own views to Jen directly. However, every time she mentions Jen’s name, she references their opposing views – with sentences such as “I’ll have to ask Jen, whose belief in a deity I do not share, if she can make 20 copies of that” or “Can we check if Paul, Amy, and Jen (whose belief in a deity I do not share) can make the meeting?”

Putting aside for a moment that this scenario is necessarily artificial, would it be harassment? She is not saying it directly to Jen. Her own (lack of) belief is indeed protected. There is no evidence that she is treating Jen badly; she just doesn’t share her beliefs. And yet I think that most people would agree that this is indeed harassment, because in every single interaction Liz has about Jen, if not to Jen, she uses a phrase that reminds her colleagues that Liz thinks that Jen’s religious beliefs are nonsense. Would it make a difference if she had used less forthright language about her own atheism at the outset? I think probably very little, if any.

***

I cannot see any way in which a person could ‘misgender’ a colleague behind their back, even while avoiding using any pronoun but “you / your” to their face, without falling into the same error. Every interaction about the person serves only to reiterate and reinforce the disputed issue, and to remind everyone present of the subject’s biological sex. On that basis I tentatively disagree with Naomi’s view that refusing to use someone’s preferred pronouns will “almost never” amount to harassment.

This of course raises the question as to whether requiring an employee to use preferred pronouns stumbles into the same trap. Using the same, admittedly imperfect, analogy, would it amount to requiring Liz to refer to Jen as “Jen (whose faith I share)” at all times? On balance I don’t think that it would. This is partly because employees do say – may even be required to say – things at work which they would not say outside work – such as “have a nice day” to a customer upon whom they wish nothing but leeches and misery, or “our products are the best” when their own preference is the product of a competitor. 

But it is also because, socially, pronouns have a little more fluidity than the GC view tends to admit. ‘Passing’ trans people, however few in number, have been referred to in their preferred pronouns since Lili Elbe in the 1930s, through to Christine Goodwin in the 1990s and on to today. The use of feminine pronouns among effeminate gay men has been both reality and the subject of comedy, sometimes self-deprecating comedy, for decades. Are we really to believe that a neurotypical employee who could understand that “ooh, get her” might refer to a male person would still find referring to John / Jen as “her”  impossible? And is it really coherent to say that using a socially feminine-coded name – a proper noun – is a reasonable request for a male person but using a socially feminine-coded pronoun – a substitute for that proper noun – is not?

While it is of little immediate help to employees, HR departments, or those with the protected characteristics of gender reassignment or gender critical belief, the historical tendency of the English language to develop along the path of least difficulty may resolve this over the next century or so. In 2121, the use of the singular “he/she” may be as archaic as the 2021 use of the singular “thou/thee,” retained only in local dialect or historical language, or as completely obsolete as the 1021 use of the dual pronoun (wit – we two, git – you two). Equally plausibly, in 2121, linguistics students may be studying as a sociolinguistic phenomenon the brief historic revival of the Chaucerian singular ‘they’ in the 2010-2030 period. Who knows? 

Meanwhile, at least until there is a reasonable body of case law on the subject, I think that ‘misgendering’ a specific colleague may very arguably amount to harassment. Either Naomi or I will be wrong – or, given how case law develops, we will both be right and wrong on different points and at different times. 

Protection and safety: a right or a privilege?

Guest blogger Ffion Lloyd writes for Legal Feminist on the Refugee Convention of 1951 and argues that persecution on the basis of sex should be formally recognised within it.

The 1951 Refugee Convention is a United Nations multilateral treaty, currently ratified by 148 countries. The Convention is the key legal document in defining who is a refugee, a refugee’s rights and the obligations on member states. The Convention sets out the bases upon which a person is entitled to refugee status: if they have  ‘a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group’. The primary aim of the Convention is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. In its efforts to achieve this aim, the Convention alongside the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), strives to ensure everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in other countries. However, despite these admirable aims, refugee rights are restricted due to the Convention reasons, arguably, being  outdated (as per G S Goodwin-Gill and J McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, Clarendon Press, 2007) 86 – 96), because there is little or no explicit protection from specific abuses that only apply to women. As argued by Charlesworth and Chaiton in The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis “the very nature of international law has made dealing with the structural disadvantages of sex and gender difficult.” 

Historically, the protection of refugees was a matter of discretion dependent on the willingness of individual sovereign states. It included those who did not fall within any major international treaties, but who were deemed to have a valid claim to protection. In the 20th century refugee protection evolved domestically through ad hoc measures applied to new refugee groups, who were originally excluded from the Convention. This represented a positive development in human rights as it was the first of its kind to attempt to protect all refugees. Additionally, as interpretation of the Convention has varied, it has enabled countries to implement a degree of refugee protection alongside domestic laws. Nonetheless, the Convention has had fundamental flaws from its inception. One of the main historical criticisms of the Convention has been its enduring lack of protection of refugee women, who constitute half of all refugees.

Under the Convention, the Convention reasons of ‘social groups’ and ‘political opinions’ lack clarity. The Convention does not refer to sex as a ground for being afforded protection, an omission considered by some to be a failing of the Convention. The significance of this is that women are not expressly protected as falling within a Convention reason, despite  high incidences of female genital mutilation (FGM), human trafficking, forced marriages and rape cases. 

The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines FGM as “procedures that intentionally alter or cause injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons” . It is a practice female refugees confront in their countries of origin and is one of the biggest problems facing female refugees.  According to a UNICEF report (2020) 29 countries allow FGM and it is claimed 52 million females alive today have undergone FGM. However, the number of women and girls who have undergone FGM could be substantially higher, as reliable worldwide data is not available. However, because sex is not a Convention reason to recognise persecution, protection from this specific abuse is inconsistent under the Convention, even though it is recognised as a violation of  female human rights, including freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, as well as right to health. FGM is a crime in many countries including the USA, the UK and South Africa where it is recognised as  a form of violence against females. It causes long lasting physical and psychological harm and is in direct opposition to  basic human rights

This was demonstrated in the case of Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department in which Fornah claimed she could not return to Sierra Leone because she would face gender-based persecution by being forced to endure FGM. Consequently, the UK House of Lords agreed “intact” women in Sierra Leone, who had not undergone FGM, constituted a particular social group, for the purposes of the 1951 Convention. However, because sex is not a Convention reason, each FGM claim will need to be assessed on its own, to establish whether women facing FGM in that particular country, at a particular age, from a particular tribe or background, constitute a ‘particular social group.’ If not, then the woman is not protected under the Refugee Convention although she may be able to access alternative humanitarian protection.   Consequently, in my view, the Convention lags behind current global affairs because of the inconsistency of interpretation.

Baroness Hale stated in the case of Fornah that if the refugee definition was properly interpreted, it “can encompass gender-related claims.” On the other hand, despite the Convention allowing room for interpretation, under French refugee law, women who have already experienced FGM are not entitled to any form of protection. A third of the claims for refugee status in France have been made by females and of 36,720 applicants only 4,713 were granted refuge. Under French refugee law, the experience of past FGM is not regarded as constituting persecution, despite the risk of further FGM abuses. The assumed justification for this is that the mutilation is a single act that will not be repeated in the future and will not lead to further persecution. This line of reasoning was rejected in the USA in the case of Mukasey, in which the Board of Immigration Appeals held a woman who has been subject to FGM can be cut a second time. Despite this finding, France has not updated its refugee law. 

The UK only recently had its first ever successful criminal trial on FGM. In February 2019 a mother was sentenced to 14 years in prison for performing FGM on her 3-year-old daughter. This case demonstrates, although countries are attempting to protect vulnerable women and girls, it is clear more needs to be done. Despite this case being a success for female equality and basic human rights, it is unsettling that the UK only recently successfully protected its most vulnerable females. This case highlights how slow the law is on offering protection to females, specifically female refugees. 

Forced marriage has been acknowledged (in the phrase used by UNHCR) as a gender‐related form of persecution in some jurisdictions. Currently 117 countries allow forced marriages. Canada has accepted gender‐based grounds for refugee claims since the mid 1990’s, which includes forced marriage. Additionally, in TB (PSG – Women) Iran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal held “young Iranian women who refuse to enter into arranged marriages” constituted a particular social group. Consequently, the appellant’s claim for asylum was upheld by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal as she would be persecuted if returned to Iran. Despite the Refugee Convention being written in 1951, certain countries have interpreted it to protect female refugees from specific abuses, such as forced marriages, highlighting it is possible to protect female refugees from this type of persecution. Nevertheless, despite the UK and other countries achieving great strides in human rights and acknowledging the specific abuses female refugees are subject to, it is becoming more apparent that more needs to be done. It is striking, that even post Shah and Islam UK, there is still no particular social group for women fleeing forced marriage, as the current Convention stands.  

One of the main challenges facing the protection of female refugees from forced marriages is the domestic law and customs of the countries where forced marriage is legal. It is particularly notable that women’s education levels are a high factor when it comes to the forced marriages of female refugees. Educated women are better able to recognise their experiences as abuse, while less educated women may accept it as normality. A study in 2008 highlighted urban and highly educated women in Lebanon were ‘somewhat less constrained’ by social customs and ‘would not be subject to forced marriage, and if she were, could evade it.’ Consequently, the education of female refugees is paramount in reducing the level of risk they may face of specific abuses.

In recent years, international organizations have paid increasing attention to a particular problem affecting female refugees, human trafficking. Female refugees need more international protection from human trafficking. While not all victims of trafficking are refugees, depending on the circumstances, many victims of human trafficking qualify for refugee status. Female refugees are at particular risk of being victims of human trafficking. This is due to many factors, including their vulnerable status, the losses they have experienced and their displacement geographically. According to the UNHCR, trafficking risks for female refugees are increasing worldwide. Under the current grounds of persecution of the Convention, protection for female refugees from human trafficking is non-existent, meaning female refugees must depend on the domestic laws of the country they are in. 

In times of conflict and chaos, female refugees are often pressured into work where they are exploited and abused. Prostitution is often one of the only ways female refugees can make money for their families. However, the voluntary nature of such work is questionable when there is no alternative source of income – and indeed exploitation of a position of vulnerability is recognised within the Palermo Protocol as a form of coercion. Individuals are at serious risk of falling into the hands of sex traffickers. This is compounded by the lack of protection for female refugees under the current grounds for persecution, forcing many female refugees into extremely dangerous situations

To conclude, at the time of its establishment, the 1951 Refugee Convention made great strides in human rights, but now, as the world changes, the Convention’s deliberate gender-blindness is an impediment, rather than an asset, to justice for female refugees. As illustrated above, it is possible for countries to interpret the Convention so that ‘particular social group’ extends to protection against specific abuses that only happen to female refugees, but this relies on interpretation. In my view, interpretation is not enough: protection for female refugees should be a codified right, not a privilege at the discretion of the member state’s interpretation. 

The current situation  leaves room for instability and uncertainty, and uncertainty gives rise in turn to grey areas where female refugees are protected in some countries and not in others. To reiterate the words of Charlesworth and Chaiton “The realities of women’s lives do not fit easily into the concepts and categories of international law”. Perhaps it is time that those concepts and categories are re-moulded to allow them to do so. An amended Refugee Convention is overdue, as the unique needs of female refugees must be protected, and the empowerment and the equality of females supported. 

I Know It When I See It

Legal Feminist welcomes feminist blog posts from practising lawyers. In this post, guest blogger and paralegal Ffion Lloyd writes about the shocking growth of the incel movement and suggests the time has come to treat it as a terrorist movement.

We all know the phrase, ‘I know it when I see it’, when you may struggle to describe or pinpoint what ‘it’ exactly is, however, we all feel it and know where ‘its’ boundaries are. Schmid and Jongman described terrorism as acts committed for “idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons.” This definition includes mass attacks by non-ideological psychotics. The Crown Prosecution Service describes terrorism as “the use or threat of action… designed to influence any international government organisation or to intimidate the public” which is “for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause” and cites examples as including “serious violence against a person” “endangering a person’s life” and “creating a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public”.

Despite these recognised and accepted definitions, there remain a number of organisations and groups in the UK which blatantly pose a threat to the safety and security of society and yet are not recognised by the authorities as terrorist or as holding terrorist ideologies. 

On Thursday 12th August 2021 Britain witnessed its worst mass shooting in nearly a decade. A country that, since the Dunblane shootings, has successfully avoided the horror of mass shootings. We have prided ourselves on being the complete opposite to the USA when it comes to gun control.  The UK has strict and rigorously enforced gun control laws; anyone caught in possession of an illegal firearm will face a mandatory minimum prison sentence of seven years.

But in spite of our tight gun control, two women, two men and a three-year-old girl were fatally shot in 12 minutes by a 22-year-old, self-identified ‘incel’. In the aftermath of this shocking event, use of the phrase “incel” had the media frantically seeking to explain what this right-wing, misogynistic ideology stands for. However, this is not a new term let alone a new group. A January 2020 report by the Texas Department of Public Safety warned that incels were an “emerging domestic terrorism threat” that “could soon match, or potentially eclipse, the level of lethalness demonstrated by other domestic terrorism types“.

Alongside that report, a 2020 paper, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, published by Bruce Hoffman noted that the incel movement’s “core ethos entails the subjugation and repression of a group and its violence is designed to have far-reaching societal effects” and concluded that “the violent manifestations of the ideology pose a new terrorism threat, which should not be dismissed or ignored by domestic law enforcement agencies“. Yet despite these warnings, Jake Davison, a 22-year-old guy from Plymouth, was frequently and freely able to post YouTube videos, actively discussing his life failures and angrily complaining that the root cause of his insecurities and lack of sexual experience were the fault of women. More specifically, the lack of interest women had in him.

The Incel movement is an inherently misogynistic internet subculture that has reportedly led to over 61 homicide deaths since its founding. The term “involuntary celibate” arose in the 1990s and originally had no violent connotation. However over the last two decades, the incel community became increasingly misogynistic, blaming women and glorifying rape and violence against women.  Then in 2014, Elliot Rodger murdered 6 people, and wounded 14 others, as part of what he called a “Day of Retribution” rooted in the frightening notion that women were fundamentally flawed and deserved death. Rodger went on to write his lengthy 133-page manifesto in which he rationalises the massacre of women. In his “ultimate and perfect ideology of… a fair and pure world,” all women should be “quarantined” in “concentration camps,” where he could “gleefully watch them die,” though some would be kept alive and artificially inseminated to perpetuate humanity. Following this event, pro-violent, internet subcultures have continued to grow and have resulted in several murders and attacks by men propagating this terrifying ideology. 

Despite this, as the law currently stands in the UK incel ideologies are seemingly not regarded a dangerous enough to be classed as terrorism. In the past, extremist groups which have sought to overthrow the social order,  the IRA, the LTTE and most recently ISIS, have been deemed terrorist organisations. Why is the incel movement any different?  

ISIS provides a good case in point – it is recognised as representing a direct threat to the security of a country and its interests; the incel movement undermines democratic norms and values of equality and shares a number of similarities. They are male dominated, historically anti-women and heavily rely on the internet and online forums as a primary communication tool. While anti-women views existed long before the internet, subsections of the internet have accelerated their spread, expanded their reach and fuelled their women hating content.

The nature of attacks, perpetrated by violent radicalized groups such as the incel movement and ISIS, have a very gendered dimension which is predominately virtual and largely comprises young males. How can it be that one an illegal terrorist organisation and the other simply frowned upon, when at their core, they have such fundamental similarities? Does the fact that ISIS is founded in a religious doctrine make it fundamentally more dangerous? It is very hard to see why that should be the case.  If that is the case, what is the difference? Are incels deemed less dangerous because they predominantly target women and not men? Does this somehow make them less of a threat to society? 

If so, this is naive, given incel perpetrators have clearly shown that their attacks also target men, who are deemed attractive and lucky in life (‘chads’). More to the point, the suggestion that hatred of women is somehow less of a threat is also a terrifying conclusion. Violent attacks on women in general have been all too frequent items in the news in recent years, from the shocking assassination of Jo Cox to the brutal murder of Sarah Everard. The murder of Sarah Everard led to an outpouring of concern about violence against women.  And yet despite those sentiments, society has not yet fully recognised the dangers posed by those who fundamentally hate women.  Incel related violence is explicitly aimed at instigating an overthrow of social order. 

Terrorism, I know it when I see it. When will the government? 

AEA v EHRC: An Explanation

There has been a lot of interest in human rights circles about this case and its refusal of permission to judicially review the guidance relating to single sex services. We will look at what the case was about and what the refusal to allow permission might mean. We start by introducing the parties.

The Claimant 

The Claimant was Authentic Equity Alliance (“AEA), a community interest company established in 2018 to promote the personal and professional development of women and girls.

It was asking for permission for the courts to determine whether or not the EHRC’s  (below introduced as the Defendant) guidance relating to single sex services was lawful.

The Defendant

The Defendant to the claim was the Equality and Human Rights Commission, (EHRC) a statutory non-departmental public body established by the Equality Act 2006. On its website it advertises itself in the following terms:

As a statutory non-departmental public body established by the Equality Act 2006, the Commission operates independently. We aim to be an expert and authoritative organisation that is a centre of excellence for evidence, analysis and equality and human rights law. We also aspire to be an essential point of contact for policy makers, public bodies and business.

Its job is to provide guidance and expertise on equality law. To that end it has produced various codes and documents, including the Statutory Code of Practice for Services, Public Functions and Associations (“the Code”), which is the authoritative guide to interpretation of the Equality Act. 

Principal area of concern

AEA’s claim against the EHRC focused on one paragraph of the Code:

[Text: If a service provider provides single or separate sex services for women and men, or provides services differently to women and men, they should treat transsexual people according to the gender role in which they present. However, the Act does permit the service provider to provide a different service or exclude a person from the service who is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or who has undergone gender reassignment. This will only be lawful when the exclusion is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.]

The Question of Lawfulness

The excerpt from the EHRC’s code which is copied out above  relates to  the Equality Act which allows service providers to run women only services (in Schedule 3). The Equality Act starts from a position of non-discrimination – the majority of services are available to everyone regardless of the nine protected characteristics – but accepts that there will be exceptions to this rule. Many of these are uncontroversial. It would be remarkable for someone to suggest that the Brownies are not entitled to discriminate on the basis of age, for example. 

Justified Women Only Services

Women only services are  exceptions to the starting point of non-discrimination and they are allowed under the conditions set out in Schedule 3. 

Broadly (we paraphrase and are not delving into technical details here)

Requirement 1

  • It is lawful, and will not be sex discrimination, to offer single or separate sex services (SSS) when this is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim (Paragraph 26 – 27 )

Requirement 2

  • it is lawful, and will not be gender reassignment discrimination, to offer SSS, if the conduct in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (Paragraph 28)  

The Substance of the Claim

The claim that was brought was, as the judge said at the end, complicated. A simplified – possibly oversimplified – summary is this:

Prescriptive Inclusion: The “Must” Approach

The Claimant, AEA, said that the phrase in the COP “should treat transsexual people according to the gender role in which they present” had wrongly led service providers to think that they must treat people according to the role in which they present. The Claimant provided evidence of various bodies which had adopted this position (as discussed below). 

The Defendant, EHRC, said that 

  • the COP said “should,” not “must,” 
  • that exceptions were available, and 
  • that the bodies which had adopted the “must” position had not expressly said that they had had regard to the COP. On that basis, the EHRC said that those bodies cannot have been led, or misled, by the COP, as none of them mentioned it. 

In fact, the EHRC said, a policy that said a service provider ‘must’ treat people according to the role in which they present would be “directly inconsistent” with the COP. 

In other words – other bodies may well be making this unlawful assertion, but it ain’t us guv.

The EHRC suggested that if other bodies had unlawful policies, these should be challenged directly, rather than holding EHRC itself responsible for bodies which should have followed its guidance, but either did not do so or misunderstood it – although naturally, the EHRC was not willing to concede that anyone had been misled in the absence of a smoking gun in the form of a policy which said “and we got this off the EHRC Codes Of Practice”. This, as we will come to shortly, is important. 

Extent of Justification Required 

The Claimant said that if a service provider meets the first requirement  (paragraphs 26-27 of schedule 3) and identifies that providing a woman only service is a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim,’ it need not meet the second requirement (paragraph 28 of schedule 3) in order to lawfully provide a female-only or male-only service. 

The ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ having been once identified for the purposes of providing the service at all to the exclusion of persons of the opposite sex, there was no need to re-invent the wheel by identifying it again for the purposes of excluding a person of the opposite sex who also had the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. 

The EHRC said that this was wrong. It said that the AEA’s analysis didn’t account for those who had lived ‘for many years’ in an acquired role and yet had not, for whatever reason, applied for a GRC. It might be reasonable to include such a person notwithstanding that they were legally male, while it might be equally reasonable to exclude someone with a GRC who was legally female.

At this stage the parties’ arguments essentially converged. Both parties were arguing that a GRC was not relevant to the provision of a single sex service. 

Whether Appearance is a factor

The court examined the situation where a person using a woman only service is  “visually indistinguishable” from a woman and what this means in law. 

This phrase’s provenance is from a case which predates the Gender Recognition Act (“GRA”),  A v CC West Yorks. It was about  a transsexual MTF police officer who argued that she had suffered discrimination because she was refused employment, as she would not able to search female prisoners. [For the avoidance of doubt, the court held that Ms A “appeared in every respect to be a woman” – this is not a case in which Ms A asserted a gender identity at odds with appearance which would, nevertheless, today bring her within the scope of the Equality Act.  The case was brought because a prohibition on conducting searches would alert her colleagues to her trans status, which was not known to them. There is absolutely no suggestion that she was seeking inappropriate contact with female prisoners. ]

The House of Lords held that sex could include  “the acquired gender of a post-operative transsexual who is visually and for all practical purposes indistinguishable from non-transsexual members of that gender. No one of that gender searched by such a person could reasonably object to the search.” This was all decided under the provisio that the GRA would consider and address the issue of legal sex.  

Times have changed. The GRA is now in force. We no longer assume that gender reassignment means “a post-operative transsexual” and we now understand intimate searches to be something to which a person consents, not to which they object – albeit lack of consent may be no obstacle where the relevant PACE requirements are satisfied.

However personal appearance is  a factor which both parties acknowledged as relevant when providing a single sex service and applying the exceptions. In a situation satisfactory to nobody, personal appearance is relevant when assessing whether excluding a transwoman from a woman only service is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 

The decision

The Judge decided that  AEA’s question about the lawfulness of the EHRC’s guidance should not be put in front of the courts. His  job was not to decide what the correct interpretation of the law was at this stage. All he had to do was decide if AEA’s claim was “arguable” – that is, was it arguable that the EHRC’s guidance was so wrong as to be unlawful. 

He decided it was not, for the following reasons:

  1. On the first argument, he agreed that the COP said “should,” not “must.” He pointed out that the guidance extends to just four paragraphs and is intended to be a brief summary not a detailed legal analysis. After “should” comes the disclaimer “However,” followed by an explanation of where exclusion will be reasonable. Although it is not detailed, it is not intended to be an exhaustive guide.
  2. He also agreed that if there are public bodies which have understood a ‘should’ as a ‘must,’ these are capable of challenge by individual service users to individual service providers, whether inclusive or exclusive. We look at this below. 
  3. On the second argument, he agreed with the EHRC that even if a service has met the first requirement by showing it needs to be a single or separate sex service in order to exclude men, nevertheless, it must also meet the second requirement to exclude transwomen where necessary. 
  4. It may well be that a service needs to be female only, but the variation in presentations of transwomen from someone who is ‘visually indistinguishable’ to someone who has only just announced an intention to transition, and the variation in needs of the service users from a rape crisis centre to a changing room with partitioned cubicles, mean that there cannot be the certainty advanced by the Claimant.
  5. In respect of the third argument, the judge agreed that physical appearance is relevant. This is unfortunate. Someone who is genuinely visually indistinguishable will be unlikely to cause challenge or consternation on accessing a SSS, even if they should choose to do so. Focus on a person’s physical appearance is likely to be experienced as demeaning by both the subject and the person required to make the assessment.

THE EHRC’s Stance on Single Sex Services

It would have been significant if the EHRC had been forced  to change its guidance, but the refusal of permission means that the existing situation continues – but with the welcome clarity that the EHRC has acknowledged that there are instances where refusing access to a person of the opposite sex is perfectly reasonable and not phobic. 

The EHRC made two important concessions:

  1. It  distanced itself from prescriptive public guidance that those who self identify as such “must” be treated as women, 
  2. It  made clear that in its view that a women only service is permissible and  the correct approach is more nuanced  with a starting point of inclusion but recognising that exclusion can be  justified (due to being a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’).

What does all this mean?

EHRC agrees that women only space does not have to include anyone who is male at birth, and described prescriptive inclusion policies along the lines of self-ID as “directly inconsistent” with the Code of Practice.

And where should these cases be brought?

The judge strongly agreed with the EHRC that a better challenge would have been brought by an individual service user against an individual service provider, rather than in the abstract at the level of the EHRC and the AEA.

Whilst a reasonable view in law, this is a sad outcome for both trans and feminist service users and for service providers engaging with SSS policies. Women’s services such as crisis centres, refuges and support groups are overstretched and ill positioned to sustain lengthy legal battles.

Some of the Misleading Public Guidance

The policies which AEA had pointed to as containing misleading guidance included 

all of which envisage that a person must, in some cases from the moment they announce an intention to transition, be allowed to use shared private facilities of their preferred sex. In many of these policies there is no hint that the authors were aware that exclusion may be justified where it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 

EHRC said that there was no evidence that the authors of such policies had been led or misled by EHRC, and that the COP provided adequate guidance explaining that exclusion could be justified.

Here is what EHRC said in its skeleton argument about these documents:

“… insofar as the AEA’s primary objection is to guidance suggesting trans-persons must be allowed to  access the SSS of their acquired gender, that is directly inconsistent with the COP. As set out below, the COP makes clear, in terms, that trans-persons can be excluded from a service where that is justified, and, indeed, the EHRC has taken steps to bring that to  the attention of service-providers whose guidance erroneously suggests trans-persons  must always be permitted to use the SSS of their acquired gender irrespective of the  needs of, or detriment to, others. A striking feature of the present litigation is that, if the  AEA or others affected have identified guidance or practices of other public or private  bodies’ that does, in fact, reflect incorrect statements of law, it is not clear why they are  not being pursued. Instead, a claim has been brought in relation to the EHRC’s COP  which simply does not contain the alleged errors.” [emphasis added]

It might be considered remarkable that quite so many bodies have apparently developed policies without regard to EHRC’s express intervention and also its statutory Code of Practice, but there we have it. Policies and guidance which say a person must be allowed to access the SSS of their acquired gender without reference to possible exceptions is “directly inconsistent” with the COP, and the EHRC will correct service providers whose guidance is “erroneous” in that respect. 

What happens next?

Everyone who provides a single or separate sex service should ensure that they have good legal insurance. It seems likely that as a result of this litigation, women will take action against the individual service providers whose guidance is erroneous, and that more trans people will take action against SSS when they feel that they have been wrongly excluded. As these cases progress up from the county courts to the High Court and Court of Appeal, general principles will be developed through case law as to what a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ looks like in practice.

Organisations offering a SSS also need a policy on how, and when, they will apply the exceptions. It will not be enough simply to say “this service is female only.” The policy must set out why the SSS is justified at all and then must say that admission of transwomen is or is not likely to be justified. A blanket ban is likely to be unlawful: the rather far-fetched example was given of a transwoman with her children approaching an otherwise empty women’s refuge in the middle of the night. The policy must envisage the improbable as well as the routine.

Finally, we need more research. Many women avoid mixed space and we hypothesise they will simply self-exclude quietly, leading service providers to become complacent about the need for single sex services. “Our service is unisex,” they say “and we see no women here who have a problem with it, therefore it is unproblematic.” Women who have stopped using a service because it became mixed, or who avoid coffee shops with unisex loos, need to make this known. Service providers need good research to rely on when deciding whether a SSS is justified in order to meet women’s needs. If the service already has an inclusive or conversely an exclusive policy it will not be enough to simply consult with existing service users – it will be necessary to identify potential users too because the policy will have defined the existing service user group. 

SINGLE SEX CYCLING

British Cycling has posted a consultation on their proposed ‘Transgender and Non-Binary Participation Policy’.  We take a look at the parts of the Equality Act 2010 that are relevant to single-sex sporting events and highlight some of the issues we consider relevant to the consultation response.

The policy can be accessed here:

Responses to the consultation are invited by way of a survey available here:

Legal Definitions

The Equality Act 2010 defines a “transsexual” person as someone who “is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex”.  That person will then have the ‘protected characteristic’ of “gender reassignment”.  The term ‘transexual’ is now considered to be outdated and ‘transgender’ is typically used instead, but there is no legal difference in the terminology.  A person does not have to have had any form of surgery or hormonal treatment to acquire the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

A person may have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment without their legal sex being changed from that which was recorded on their birth certificate at birth.  It is only where a person has a Gender Recognition Certificate (‘GRC’) issued under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 that their legal sex is officially changed.  Fewer than 5,000 of the estimated 600,000 transgender people in the UK have been issued with a GRC.  It is not necessary for a person to have had any form of surgery or hormonal treatment in order to obtain a GRC, but they will have had to evidence to the satisfaction of a specialist panel that they have lived as their acquired gender for at least two years and that they have a medical diagnosis of gender dysphoria. 

The Equality Act creates a starting point that discrimination on the grounds of sex is unlawful.  It then goes on to create exceptions to this starting point that make it lawful to discriminate in a variety of specified circumstances.  For our purposes the relevant exceptions are “gender-affected” sports (section 195) and single-sex services, which includes the provision of changing facilities and of recreational sporting activities (schedule 3 paragraphs 27 and 28).

Sport

Similar to section 19 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, section 195(3) of the Equality Act 2010 defines a “gender-affected activity” as 

“a sport, game or other activity of a competitive nature in circumstances in which the physical strength, stamina or physique of average persons of one sex would put them at a disadvantage compared to average persons of the other sex as competitors in events involving the activity.”

Section 195(1) provides that it is not unlawful to discriminate on the basis of sex in relation to a person’s participation in a “gender-affected activity”.  This means that it is permitted for an event organiser to hold separate competitions for male and female competitors or to run separate classes for either sex within the same sporting event.  

If a sport is deemed to be a “gender-affected activity” it is lawful to limit or refuse a transgender person entry to a particular competition if it is “necessary to do so to secure … (a) fair competition, or (b) the safety of competitors”.

This would mean that it would be lawful for British Cycling to refuse to admit all transwomen entry to a female-only competition if it was considered that the effects of going through a male puberty would create a residual biological advantage in a transwoman competitor (such as height, cardio-vascular capacity, muscle mass), notwithstanding that the competitor had demonstrated suppressed testosterone levels for the required 12 month period.   This would be lawful regardless of whether or not the transwoman holds a GRC.   A failure to take these factors into account could found a claim by female competitors for indirect discrimination.

It would be unlawful to prevent a transwoman from competing in an ‘open’ or men’s category competition.

Services

The exceptions in relation to the provision of services are relevant to non-competitive cycling events and to the provision of changing facilities at an event, whether competitive or not.

Non-Competitive Events

It is lawful to hold single-sex recreational events such as a ‘women only’ cycling event, whether as a one-off or as a regular program.  

Paragraph 27 of Schedule 3 provides that it is lawful to provide a single-sex service where 

a joint service for persons of both sexes would be less effective, and the extent to which the service is required by persons of each sex makes it not reasonably practicable to provide separate services”, provided that it is a “proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.  

Increasing women’s participation in cycling, and in sport generally, is a legitimate aim.  Given that there are a vast number of events that are open to men and/or people of both sexes, it is proportionate to hold women-only events to create a more female-friendly atmosphere. 

When the single-sex provisions are properly relied upon, it becomes lawful to exclude all male people from that event.  This would include transwomen who do not hold a GRC.

It can be lawful to exclude transwomen who do hold a GRC, but the justification for doing so has to be more finely balanced.   This is set out in paragraph 28 of Schedule 3.  Exclusion from the event would not be on the basis that the person’s legal sex is male, but rather, it would be on the basis that they are transgender.  Factors that are relevant to the proportionality exercise can include, for example, whether the event is aimed at women who share particular religious beliefs that limit socialisation with males outside their family.

A woman who felt unable to take part in a ‘women only’ event that was open to transwomen, because of her religious or other protected belief, or because she has previously been a victim of male violence could potentially bring a claim for indirect discrimination.

Alternatively, if a transwoman is excluded from an event for women only because she is perceived as male (notwithstanding her legal status), that is at least arguably sex discrimination (not gender reassignment discrimination), and permitted by paragraph 27 of schedule 3. 

Changing Facilities

The same provisions in schedule 3 paragraphs 27 and 28 apply to single-sex changing facilities, whether they are provided at a competitive or recreational event.  It is lawful to exclude males as a class from women’s toilets and changing facilities where “the circumstances are such that a person of one sex might reasonably object to the presence of a person of the opposite sex.”

It may also be lawful to exclude a transwoman who holds a GRC from those spaces on grounds of gender reassignment where it is proportionate to do so.  Such considerations may be whether the facilities are communal as opposed to fully-enclosed cubicles.  The legitimate aim of encouraging more women into sport should be given particular weight.  The impact on women who have suffered sex-based violence and trauma from males must be counted.  The needs of all women to privacy, dignity and a sense of safety when changing is reasonable aim that cannot be achieved by compelling them to undress in close proximity to bodies readily perceived as male.

Alternatively, it may be more straightforward simply to characterise that exclusion as discrimination on grounds of perceived sex, which will always be lawful provided the initial conditions for the provision of a single-sex or separate-sex service are met.

Response to Consultation Questions

Q1: Definitions

·      Birth Gender: the gender that a person is assumed to be when they are born. This is usually based on the Sex they are assigned at birth. 

Comment:

This is not a term recognised in law.  It conflates the concept of ‘gender’ with the recording of a person’s sex at birth.  It adds nothing in terms of clarity to the definition of ‘sex’ below.  This definition should be removed. Where relevant the appropriate term would be “sex recorded at birth”.

·      Self-Identified Gender: the gender that the person identifies as, opposed to that which is assigned at birth, their ‘Birth Gender’. 

Comment:

      This is muddled:

–       Sex is recorded at birth, gender is not.

–       As above, ‘Birth Gender’ adds nothing to the definition of ‘sex’.

–       It conflates the situations of people who are transgender by virtue of ‘self-identification’ with those who have legally changed their sex upon the issuance of a GRC.  Their status’ are legally distinct.

Suggest amending to:

Self-Identified Gender: the gender that the person identifies as, opposed to the sex recorded on their birth certificate.

·      Sex: a person’s biological and physical characteristics, defined usually as either ‘male’ or ‘female’ and including indeterminate Sex. 

Comment:

‘Indeterminate sex’ is an inappropriate term. People with chromosomal anomalies that result in Differences of Sexual Development (‘DSD’) are still recognised as being either male or female.

To properly recognise people who have been issued with a Gender Recognition Certificate, suggest amending to:

Sex: a person’s biological and physical characteristics, defined usually as either ‘male’ or ‘female’, or their ‘legal sex’ as recorded in their Gender Recognition Certificate.

·      Transgender: a person whose Gender Identity is different from their physical Sex at birth. Those people who, as defined by the Equality Act 2010, share the protected characteristic of gender reassignment and are described as transsexual people under the legislation. 

Comment:

This definition is broader than the protected characteristic of ‘gender reassignment’ in the Equality Act.  The Act requires that a person is “proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex”.  Merely identifying as being of a different gender from one’s birth sex is not sufficient to bring a person under the definition of this protected characteristic.  Given that this would form the basis for deciding whether an individual is protected from discrimination and the application of single sex exceptions, this requires precision and therefore suggest amending to the legal definition:

Transgender: a person proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex. Those people who, as defined by the Equality Act 2010, share the protected characteristic of gender reassignment and are described as transsexual people under the legislation.

Q2: Membership 

The following amendments are suggested:

·      “gender other than that assigned at birth” amend to “gender other than their sex as recorded at birth”

·      “for sporting purposes” amend to “for the purposes of British Cycling events and activities”

·      “obtain British Cycling Race Membership in their Self-Identified Gender” amend to “obtain British Cycling Race Membership in their Self-Identified Gender or legal sex as recognised by a Gender Recognition Certificate”.  

At present the policy does not expressly consider transgender people who have a GRC and who have already changed their legal sex; it appears as it only requires a person who does not have a GRC to present medical evidence that they meet the conditions set out in paragraph 5.  As there is no medical condition attached to the issuance of a GRC, the policy must make it clear that both self-identified transgender people and those who hold a GRC must satisfy the medical requirements.

·      “their membership shall be in their Self-Identified Gender rather than the Sex assigned at birth” amend to “their membership shall be in their Self-Identified Gender or reassigned Gender pursuant to a Gender Recognition Certificate rather than the Sex recorded at birth” 

Q 3: Recreational Activity 

This section of the policy, in conjunction with the provisions relating to membership in section 2 allows any male person, even if he is not actually transgender, full and unfettered access to women only cycling events and to women’s toilets and changing rooms provided at those events.  All that is required is that he signs a declaration that for “sporting purposes”, he wishes to be treated as if he is female.  He does not have to show that he in any way ‘lives as a woman’ or even that he is actually transgender.

The policy fails to apply the single-sex exceptions as contained in schedule 3 of the Equality Act.  Failure to provide appropriate single-sex facilities would unlawfully discriminate against women who attend, or wish to attend an event.  It is also contrary to British Cycling’s stated aims of increasing the participation of women in the sport. 

Q4: Competition

This policy should be worded with greater clarity.  

In relation to licences to complete in the female category there is no specification of how the reduction of testosterone has to be evidenced.  Is it sufficient to produce a Medical attestation demonstrating that the required hormone levels were met 12 months prior to the date of application?  Must this also be evidenced at a date and shortly prior to application and if so, within what time?  Is evidence in the intervening period required?  How often must testosterone levels be monitored thereafter- is an annual test sufficient?

If a competitor is issued with a female race licence but then fails to evidence that they have kept their testosterone reduced to the correct level in the subsequent 12 months, what happens to any titles, prize money etc that they may win during that period?  

In relation to licences to complete in the male category there is no reference to the Therapeutic Use Exemption certificates that would be required in relation to a transman injecting testosterone.  

Q 4 Other Comment 

Public Sector Equality Duty

British Cycling is likely to be bound by the requirements of section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 – the Public Sector Equality Duty.  This applies to some private organisations if they carry out a “function of a public nature”.  British Cycling is funded in part by public funds, and exercises delegated powers from Sport England.  Its role as a governing body for the sport, including its role in the selection and management of national teams means that it is likely to be deemed meet this criteria.

It therefore has a duty: 

“in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to—

(a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act;

(b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it;

(c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.”

It is obliged to consciously direct its mind to these obligations and to evidence that it has analysed its policies to ensure compliance with the Equality Act.  This would involve taking proper consideration of the rights and views of people of all protected characteristics.  British Cycling should carry out an equality impact assessment, informed by a proper consultation with its members to assess the impact of this policy on people of all protected characteristics and particularly on women, including women of minority ethnicities and religions. 

Emma Stuart King