Ciara Watkin: Where did the deception start?

When I first saw the photographs of Ciara Watkin (CW), a trans identified man, taken during his sexual assault trial at Teesside Crown Court, I wondered how anyone gifted with sight could mistake him for a woman. The heart of the case against him was that he had obtained consent to sexual activity by a  deception as to his sex. In other words, he had led his victim (V) to believe that he was female. 

It seemed absurd. In the press photos, CW wore false eyelashes and women’s clothing, but he also had visible stubble, a typically male browbone and jaw and, in profile, it was clear that he has a penis.

Understandably, his defence relied on the fact that he was so observably male that V’s assertion of being deceived must have been untrue; perhaps shame, embarrassment, regret, internalised homophobia, or a combination of these factors moved V to close his eyes to the obvious. 

I had the advantage of attending the trial during the judge’s summing up of the evidence. It was as thought-provoking as it was illuminating. 

The Evidence

The sexual assaults took place when both CW and the victim were 17, four years before the trial. 

The two met on snapchat, where CW presented as a girl. 

When they met up and sexual activity started, CW told the victim that he was menstruating at the time, which V accepted as a reason for CW’s refusal to let V touch his chest, thighs or groin area. 

They met a second time at V’s home. At trial, V’s mother explained that she suspected that CW was a boy but said nothing at the time to V. At some point, some of V’s friends unexpectedly arrived. They were less circumspect than his mother and, with the kind of tact we readily associate with teenaged boys, mocked V about this “girl” being a boy. Still V continued to accept CW’s deception. 

CW’s mother told CW that it was not fair to lead V on, and that she thought he should tell V that he was trans.

At some point CW blocked contact from V, but a little later messaged him to disclose that he (CW) was trans. V’s mother saw her son’s reaction to this communication, which was one of shock and incredulity. V later described how painful and difficult the news was, because he “doesn’t swing that way”. 

It was not V who went initially to the police; it was a staff member at his school.

In his police interview, CW admitted deliberately deceiving V into believing he was female and accepted that he did so because he didn’t think V would be interested in him if he had disclosed that he was male.

How did it happen?

So how earth did CW fool V? Isn’t there something questionable about V’s claim that he didn’t know?

The jury clearly accepted that he had been deceived, and CW did too. It also seems that their respective mothers and V’s friends also saw that he had been deceived. 

Evidence of a complainant’s sexual history in such cases is treated as inadmissible unless it can be shown to meet stringent legal criteria as to its relevance to the case. I am not aware of any evidence about V’s sexual experience, save for the judge’s comment that he was “naïve”. 

The physical maturation that takes place between the ages of 17 and 21 can be very significant indeed. There are no publicly available photos of CW at the time, at least none which haven’t been very heavily filtered, so it is not safe to assume that unfiltered pictures of him now reflect his unfiltered appearance at the time. 

Psychological maturation and the impact of life experience are no less significant. It is not fair or accurate to ask a jury to use the map of two 21 year olds to navigate the territory of two 17 year olds. 

I think it is also important to bear in mind the possibility that a flirtatious or sexually charged exchange (between inexperienced adolescents) can create a powerful cognitive bias, effectively priming the victim of a deception to continue to accept the deception. Crudely put, we see what we are looking to see, and so it is not implausible to me that V went to meet a girl he fancied and, the exchanges with the girl he fancied firmly imprinted on his mind, perceived the person he met as precisely that. 

Much of the reporting of this case has been sensationalist, trading heavily on a “WTF?” reaction to the unfiltered, contemporary photos of CW. I’m not suggesting that the press shouldn’t be able to report the case in that way, but I think it must be agonising for the victim. The entire country was invited to laugh at him for his credulity, almost as if he was to blame for an experience that has left him not knowing who he is.

Our freedom to choose the sex of our partner, on each occasion, is integral to our sexual autonomy. Sexual orientation is not, in my view, susceptible to analysis which diagnoses it as transphobic, homophobic or suffering from any other moral, political, or religious failing. To argue otherwise is vain in every sense and quite disconnected from reality. Similarly, any argument that no harm has been done if a deceived person is brought by the act to orgasm (or some other discernible degree of sexual pleasure) is a callous disaggregation of what sex can mean for the human beings involved.

In R v McNally (Justine) [2013] EWCA Crim 1051, the Court of Appeal said that there was a “common sense” difference between a sexual act performed by a man and the same sexual act performed by a woman. That difference, the Court concluded, was fundamental enough to change “the sexual nature of the act”. In this case, as in the case of McNally, the victim could not properly be said to have consented to the act. The victim consented to something quite different and so did not consent at all. 

What of Ciara Watkin?

Some may be surprised at the extent of my sympathy for Ciara Watkin. He has been held responsible for committing a number of very serious offences; he must be, because the legal responsibility begins and ends with him.

But I do not think that the wider responsibility does.  

Language used by trans activists and widely disseminated by Stonewall contrives to give the impression that, when a person identifies as trans, a right of secrecy about his or her sex is now conferred on that person. This, in the hallucination of Stonewall Law, is an absolute right and is enforceable against the whole world. In effect, no one is entitled to know the truth, still less entitled to say it.

Young people of CW’s age have been schooled in the language of “misgendering” and “deadnaming” and told that speaking accurately about someone’s sex and previous name is a source of “harm”. 

I looked at the reporting of this case by Pink News. Pink News is an online publication devoted to advancing the expansion of trans rights, a devotion seemingly rooted in the conviction that trans identified people are the most oppressed minority on the planet.

The comments were mixed, and more interesting than the article. No one was particularly condemnatory of CW; the harshest comment was that his conduct could not be condoned, and that the best policy was always disclosure. One person commented that you shouldn’t be dating if you weren’t prepared to be honest. Others believed that there was nothing wrong with what he had done, and that he was entitled to his privacy. One person opined that since the For Women Scotland judgment only related to the Equality Act, it was unfair that it was applied in criminal law. Others believed that this was a part of a growing trend of bigotry in the law, and that the victim should have been punished for his transphobia. These beliefs are one thing, but what struck me was the ignorance of the criminal law as it applies in this area. The class of deceptions which are capable of invalidating sexual consent is very narrow indeed, but the case of McNally established that it certainly includes sex. However much a person may want to be, or even imagine themselves to be, the other sex, however much a person wishes to ignore their sex, or is deeply distressed by the fact of their sex, there is no legal entitlement to deceive a sexual partner about it. 

People who, for whatever reason, present in a way which conceals their sex should surely be protected from misinformation about where the legal boundaries lie. If CW was never told that a deliberate deception as to his sex risked conviction for serious criminal offences, then it is hard to shake the feeling that we have allowed a deficit to accrue in how we educate a generation for whom successful sex-deception will be an increased risk. Those who have taken puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones will be far more likely to pass as the other sex than those who have not; this will not avail them of any legal protection if they do not disclose their sex to a partner. Indeed, the more successful a deception, and the more desired its success, the more culpable the deceiver is likely to be deemed. No one has the right to “go stealth” when it comes to sexual consent. When those who are in a position to educate decide to ignore, or promote confusion about, the law then it is most frequently going to be young, inexperienced people like CW and his victim who pay the price.  

Sarah Vine KC

Recording the sex of rapists: what does the law require?

Guest blogger Dr Claire Methven O’Brien explains how Police Scotland are mis-recording the sex of offenders.

Claire Methven O’Brien

How should public bodies, and particularly the police, record the sex of individuals charged or convicted of rape?

This once uncontroversial question is now attracting scrutiny at Holyrood, by oversight bodies and in the media. This has revealed that across the Scottish justice system, policy provides for the production of official data based on individuals’ self-identified gender rather than their biological sex. Although defended as necessary to align with human rights and equality concerns, this approach in fact contradicts international human rights requirements.

Recording sex and gender: approach of Scottish justice actors

A 2021 petition lodged with Holyrood’s Citizen Participation and Public Petitions Committee exhorted ‘Police Scotland, the Crown Office and the Scottish Court Service to accurately record the sex of people charged or convicted of rape or attempted rape’ (PE 1876).  As defined in Scotland (Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, section 1), rape may be perpetrated by a biological man or biological woman, victims may be biologically male or female, and women may also be liable on an ‘art and part’ basis. 

Accurately tracking incidence and trends in sexual crime, including with reference to specific individual characteristics, requires the collection of data on both sex and gender. However, in its evidence to the Petitions Committee, Police Scotland disclosed that on all systems such as crime management and custody databases, it uses sex and gender interchangeably – not just for rape, but for all offences, whether or not of a sexual nature. Further, the force does not ‘routinely ask the gender or sex of people with whom they interact’ but bases the sex/gender identification of individuals on how they self-declare, or ‘…on how the person presents to officers at the time of engagement’, unless doing otherwise is ‘evidentially critical’. ‘No evidence or certification as proof of biological sex or gender identity’ is required unless this is ‘pertinent’ to an investigation.

According to Police Scotland, this approach reflects ‘legislative compliance, operational need and the values of respect, integrity, fairness and human rights’ while also ‘promoting a strong sense of belonging’. 

The Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service, and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service mirror Police Scotland’s approach. This appears consistent with Scottish Government Guidance for public bodies on collecting sex and gender data for operational, statistical and research purposes, published in 2021. Policy and decision-making on ‘operational data collection decisions’, under the Guidance, is deferred to individual public authorities. Only in rare cases, the Guidance provides, will it ‘be necessary and proportionate’ for such bodies to depart from self-identified gender ‘to require a person to answer a question on their biological sex’. Though the investigation of serious sexual offences is in this regard cited as an example, on the other hand, the Guidance warns, gathering data on sex may otherwise ‘be an unjustifiable breach of privacy’. 

Sex-disaggregated data and violence against women: international standards

Are justice system actors entitled to take this approach when recording crime? At least in relation to crimes against women, it would appear not.

The UK is a party to various treaties that prohibit violence against women, including rape and sexual assault. These include the United Nations’ women’s rights convention (CEDAW, Arts 1-3, 5(a)) and the Council of Europe’s Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). The United Kingdom ratified the latter in 2022.

As part of a package of preventive measures, Article 11 of the Istanbul Convention requires states to collect data on all forms of violence against women. Although, according to the Convention’s accompanying Explanatory Report, the drafters ‘left the choice of data categories used’ to states parties, ‘as a minimum requirement, recorded data on victim and perpetrator should be disaggregated by sex, age, type of violence as well as the relationship of the perpetrator to the victim, geographical location and any other factors deemed relevant by the state in question’ (para.76). 

Highlighting that ‘The usefulness and relevance’ of data on violence against women ‘depend above all’ on their quality‘, the Explanatory Report adds, ‘public authorities such as the judiciary, the police and social welfare services will need to set-up data systems …that go beyond the internal recording of the needs of the agency’ (para. 76). While the privacy of both victims and perpetrators should be safeguarded, it is clear that no privacy-based obstacle to collecting sex-disaggregated data is foreseen (para.80; see also Art. 65 Istanbul Convention). 

Additional guidance provided by the Council of Europe identifies sex-disaggregation of data collected by law enforcement as ‘compulsory’ (p.36). Likewise, European Union-level recommendations on rape statistics in particular direct states to ‘include specific breakdowns essential for identifying rape, including data on the sex and age of the victim and perpetrator and the victim–perpetrator relationship as a minimum’.

Under the UN women’s convention, states have been recommended, ‘To develop judiciary databases on complaints, investigations, prosecutions, and  protection orders related to [gender-based violence against women] disaggregated by age, sex, disability, crime, punishment, redress and relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.’  The UN Statistical Division (UN Guidelines for Producing Statistics on Violence against Women— Statistical Surveys, pp.26-27) also presumes the collection of data on perpetrators and victims by sex.

Conclusion

Police Scotland has adopted admirable commitments and policies on violence against women. How the force’s current position on data collection was arrived at, given this, is perplexing.   

In any event, it is incorrect that legal compliance and ‘human rights’ demand gender self-identification in the generation of official data on rape and forms of violence against women, to the exclusion of data on sex. On the contrary, they preclude it.

Claire Methven O’Brien is Reader in Law in the School of Law, University of Dundee and a member of the Scottish Human Rights Commission. This article is written in a personal capacity. It is not intended and should not be understood, quoted or cited as representing the views of the Scottish Human Rights Commission or any other organisation. 

Further references

S Walby, Ensuring data collection and research on violence against women and domestic violence: Article 11 of the Istanbul Convention (COE, 2016)

Suspended sentencing: the case of Javed Miah

This is a blog about sentencing, and outrage, and outrageous sentencing.

In particular, it’s about this case of sexual assault perpetrated by a stranger, reported in the Mirror as “Dad who attacked woman walking home at night avoids jail as he ‘would lose his job.’”

The facts are thrown into particularly sharp relief this week, in the wake of the abduction and murder of Sarah Everard. The defendant, Javed Miah, walked behind the victim and bumped into her, asking her the time. After following her for a minute, he groped her bottom, pushed her to the ground, and moved his hand from her crotch up to her chest. The victim managed to connect an emergency SOS call on her mobile phone at which point he ran away. 

Miah was given a six month sentence, suspended for two years. He will also have to complete 250 hours of unpaid work, complete the sex offenders rehabilitation programme, and sign the sex offenders register for seven years. 

Women are justifiably outraged. How can a man push a woman to the ground, commit a sexual assault, seemingly intent on worse and yet walk free from court? 

Other commentators can point you towards the Sentencing Guidelines and point out that the judge has followed them. The Mirror reported that the judge called the attack ‘sustained.’  That would make it a Category 2, Culpability B offence, carrying a one year starting point with a range of a community order to two years custody. With both the logic and the emotion of a Sudoku puzzle, the starting point of one year is then adjusted up for location and timing (alleyway, after dark), then down for previous good character and remorse, ending at a 9 month sentence. A further 30% off is applied for a guilty plea, bringing it down to six months. The judge must then consider mitigation and whether or not the sentence can properly be suspended. Any sentence of 2 years or less is capable of being suspended – and there are good reasons for this: if someone loses their home, job, relationship and future prospects they are more, not less, likely to reoffend. Feed the data here into the OASys machine and we have a defendant who has a secure relationship – ding! – with a job – ding! – and a home – ding! – and children, meaning community ties – ding! – which all feeds into the assessment of a low risk of reoffending. 

So yes, assuming from the limited information in the reports that it was correctly categorised, the magistrate has applied the guidelines correctly. The defendant pleaded guilty, so we don’t even need to get into whether the prosecutor has done their job well: plainly they have. Defence lawyers are often blamed for ‘getting their client off the hook,’ but since this defendant had pleaded guilty, we can blame the defence for nothing more sinister than effective mitigation, which is the right of the most egregious criminal in the land. And of course, it would be absolutely wrong to suggest the judge was entitled to sentence the defendant for what he (probably) would have done if not for the victim’s actions, rather than for what he did do. We do not sentence people for things they didn’t do – even if we think they might have done had they had the opportunity. This is fundamental to the rule of law.

And yet. 

The purpose of this blog is not to reassure readers that the system is infallible. It is to make plain that the disquiet felt by women at sentences like this is not because women have failed to understand how the guidelines work, but because the guidelines do not reflect the terror that this type of offending causes to women going about our daily lives. We can reassure readers that such sentences are not the result of outright bias or corruption – but we would, ourselves, prefer an assurance that the Sentencing Guidelines will be updated and improved.